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Friendship as a Political Concept: 
A Groundwork for Analysis 
 
Abstract:  What kind of a concept is friendship, and what is its connection to politics? Critics 
sometimes claim that friendship does not have a role to play in the study of politics. Such objections 
misconstrue the nature of the concept of friendship and its relation to politics. In response, this 
article proposes three approaches to undersWDQGLQJ WKH FRQFHSW RI IULHQGVKLS  DV D µIDPLO\
UHVHPEODQFH¶FRQFHSWDVDQLQVWDQFHRIDQµHVVHQWLDOO\FRQWHVWHG¶FRQFHSWDQGDVDFRQFHSW
indicating a problématique. The article thus responds to the dismissal of friendship by undertaking 
the groundwork for understanding what kind of a concept friendship might be, and how it might 
serve different purposes. In so doing so it this opens the way for understanding IULHQGVKLS¶V relation 
to politics. 
Keywords:  )ULHQGVKLSVFHSWLFLVPµIDPLO\UHVHPEODQFH¶µHVVHQWLDOO\FRQWHVWHG¶SUREOpPDWLTXH 
 
Introduction 
This article prepares the way for an understanding of friendship and its relation to politics. Friendship has taken 
an increasingly prominent place in the study of politics in recent years (Devere and King, 2000; King and Smith, 
2007; Heyking and Avramenko, 2008; Devere and Smith, 2010; Devere, 2013; Koschut and Oelsner, 2014). 
Special attention has also been paid to the role of friendship in feminist theory (Friedman, 1993; Schwarzenbach, 
2009) and µDQWLFRORQLDO¶ OLWHUDWXUH (Gandhi, 2006; Nordin, 2017). In addition, much of this literature explores 
historical and theoretical precedents (Hutter, 1978; Rouner, 1994; Devere, 1999; Roshchin 2006; Heyking and 
Avramenko, 2008). Nevertheless, some circumspection persists. In the first part of this article µ&ULWLFDOYLHZVDQG
their responses: scepticism and disanalogy¶these doubts are outlined and discussed. They can be summarised 
XQGHU WZR EURDG KHDGLQJV )LUVW WKH µVFHSWLFDO¶ YLHZ GHQLHV ERWK WKH SRVVLELOLW\ DQG WKH GHVLUDELOLW\ RI DQ\
connection between friendship and politics. 6HFRQG WKH µdis-DQDORJ\¶ view considers friendship and political 
relations (such a citizenship) to be disanalogous in important ways. Both views share a central assumption: they 
frame friendship as an essentially idiosyncratic, affective, and personal relationship. As a result, friendship is not 
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to be considered a component of politics, and it is undesirable to make it so.  In response this article argues that 
these views rest on an unduly restrictive understanding of both friendship and politics, foreclosing discussion of 
these terms. 
The second part of the article µ7KHFRQFHSWRIIULHQGVKLS WKUHHDSSURDFKHV¶identifies three approaches to the 
VWXG\RIIULHQGVKLSLQSROLWLFV7KHILUVWLVWRFRQVLGHUIULHQGVKLSWREHDµIDPLO\-UHVHPEODQFH¶RUFOXVWHUFRQFHSW
This approach identifies different uses of the term friendship which are connected through sharing features. Thus, 
it is possible to conceive of varieties of friendship of which a form of political friendship is one. The second 
DSSURDFK LV WR WUHDW IULHQGVKLS DV DQ µHVVHQWLDOO\ FRQWHVWHG¶ FRQFHSW 7UHDWHG LQ VXFK D ZD\ WKH PHDQLQJ RI
friendship is contested or in dispute. This approach attempts to identify a paradigm case which is evaluative of 
the meaning of friendship itself. Thus, accounts of friendship and politics which are generated by this approach 
attempt to produce a model of political friendship as a normative ideal. Finally, friendship can be approached as 
a problématique. As problématique the focus is not so much on what friendship is, but what role it plays in political 
analysis. From this perspective, friendship is a marker not just of the bonds between persons and groups, but also 
as a part of the fabric of political life itself. The article concludes by commenting on the relationship between the 
approaches. It argues that whilst each approach focuses on friendship the approaches are motivated by, and suited 
to, different purposes. 
 
Critical views and their responses: scepticism and disanalogy 
As has been suggested, despite the growing literature on friendship and politics some scepticism about the 
connection remains. In order to explore these doubts some representative articles offering systematic criticism of 
the connection between friendship and politics will be summarised, before moving on to highlight some of the 
responses. 
Amongst those who deal directly with the quHVWLRQRI WKHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQIULHQGVKLSDQGSROLWLFV.HOOHU¶V
article µ$JDLQVWIULHQGVKLSEHWZHHQFRXQWULHV¶ is paradigmatic. Keller focuses on the question of whether states 
can be friends. Keller understands scholars such as Digeser (Digeser, 2009a, Digeser, 2009b) and Lu (Lu, 2009) 
to be basing their accounts of the connection between friendship and politics by drawing an analogy between 
SHUVRQVDQGFRXQWULHV.HOOHUFODLPVWKDWWKLVDQDORJ\LVµRQWRORJLFDOO\DQGHWKLFDOO\GXELRXV¶(Keller, 2009). In 
terms of the ontological problem, for Keller, countries cannot have friendships as friendship relates only to the 
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lives of individual human-beings (Keller, 2009: 61, 72). It is not possible to attribute emotions to a country, and 
DFRXQWU\GRHVQRWKDYHµthe need to forge its own identity and to give it meaning and structure, and it does not 
ILQG WKH WKRXJKWRI OLIHZLWKRXW IULHQGVIRUHLJQDQGIULJKWHQLQJ¶ (Keller, 2009: 60, 65). In terms of the ethical 
problems, for Keller moral claims between countries bDVHGRQIULHQGVKLSDUHDQµHSLSKHQRPHQRQ¶(Keller, 2009: 
70)DQGXOWLPDWHO\WDONRIFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIIULHQGVKLSEHWZHHQFRXQWULHVFDQEHUHGXFHGWRµFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIWKH
ULJKWVDQGLQWHUHVWVRIUHDOLQGLYLGXDOV¶(Keller, 2009: 67-68). 
.HOOHU¶VUHDVRQVIor dismissing the possibility of friendship between countries are echoed by critics who have 
been sceptical of attempts to use friendship to model relations within the state and to relate friendship to 
citizenship. Theorists who attempt this connection include Kaplan, ZKRKDVSRLQWHGWRIULHQGVKLS¶VUROHLQFUHDWLQJ
exclusivity and identity between members of the nation (Kaplan, 2007). In addition, Scorza has argued that 
(PHUVRQ¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHFRPPXQLFDWLYHQRUPVRIIULHQGVKLSµFRXOGKHOSWRHQULFKWKH contemporary practice 
RIFLWL]HQVKLS¶DQGWKDWµSHRSOHZKRXQGHUVWDQGZKDWLWPHDQVWREHDJRRGfriend DOVRNQRZVRPHWKLQJ«DERXW
ZKDWLWPHDQVWREHDJRRGFLWL]HQ¶(Scorza, 2004: 87, 103). Others have complemented citizenship with friendship 
(Farrands, 2001), or redeveloped citizenship along the lines of civic friendship (Schwarzenbach, 1996, 
Schwarzenbach, 2005, Schwarzenbach, 2009, Kahane, 1999). Wellman is illustrative of those whose who are 
critical of this approach (Wellman, 2001). Wellman recognises the appeal of conceiving of compatriots as friends, 
but his argument is to reject this attempt (Wellman, 2001: 217). Wellman contrasts compatriots/citizens to friends 
E\FODLPLQJ WKDW µ&LWL]HQVKLS LV LPSRUWDQWO\ XQOLNH IULHQGVKLS LQVRIDU DV WKe former is largely nonconsensual, 
ODFNLQJLQHPRWLRQDOFRQQHFWLRQDQGLQWHUGHSHQGHQFHDQGRIQRDSSDUHQWLQWULQVLFYDOXH¶(Wellman, 2001: 223). 
In addition, Jeske claims that those who model political obligations on friendship tend to be selective in the aspects 
of friendship that they recognise (Jeske 2008: 49). These doubts overlap with concerns raised by Mary Healy 
(Healy, 2011). Healy rejects the claim that friendship can be a metaphor or model for the bond between citizens 
because it cannot be transposed from its Ancient Greek context ± a context which is different from and 
objectionable for contemporary polities based on freedom and equality (Healy, 2011: 229-230). Again, the 
DQDORJ\LVVHHQDVGHIHFWLYHDVWKHDIIHFWLRQRIIULHQGVKLSFDQQRWµEHUHSOLFDWHGRQDODUJHVFDOH¶IULHQGVKLSLV
SDUWLDOZKHUHDVLGHDOO\MXVWLFHVKRXOGEHLPSDUWLDODQGIULHQGVKLSERQGVDUHµVXVFHSWLEOHWRWKHVDPHWHQVLRQVDV
NLQVKLSDQGWULEDODOOHJLDQFHV¶(Healy, 2011: 237).  
There are a number of responses which have been offered to critics focusing on both the ontological and ethical 
possibilities of friendship in politics. In terms of some of the ontological claims, scholars have questioned the 
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basic assumption that friendship is (and must be) a personal and affective relationship between individuals. There 
have been significant pieces of work which develop the possibility of states either being friends or displaying 
some form of friendship. For example, Berenskoetter (2007) argues that friendship helps states to form stable 
identities and to alleviate anxiety. Heimann (2012) has argued that friendship is a social role that enables states to 
to recognise their obligations. Others such as Koschut and Oelsner respond to Keller directly pointing out that 
friendship is used mHWDSKRULFDOO\ LQ ,5 µEHFDXVH LW resembles interpersonal friendship, not because it can be 
VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGO\DSSOLHGWRVWDWHV¶.RVFKXWDQG2HOVQHU'LJHVHUDOVRWDNHVXS.HOOHU¶VFKDOOHQJHQRWLQJ
WKDW µ>.HOOHU@ LV PLVWDNHQ LQ DVVXPLQJ WKDW LQWHUSHUVRQDO IULHQGVKLS PXVW EH WKH RQO\ JDPH LQ WRZQ¶ DQG WKDW
RUGLQDU\XVDJHRIWKHQRWLRQWKDWVWDWHVFDQEHIULHQGVµLVSRLQWLQJWRWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDNLQGRIUHODWLRQVKLSWKDW
LVGLIIHUHQWIURPIULHQGVKLSEHWZHHQLQGLYLGXDOV¶'LJHVHU 
Digeser thus points to the possibility of varieties of friendship. In this respect, Edyvane and Schwarzenbach are 
careful to distinguish personal and political friendship in a way which admits commonalities and structural 
similarities, but which does not collapse the two (Edyvane 2007: 152; Schwarzenbach 1996: 123). More broadly, 
in terms of historical and cultural sweep research identifies friendships which stand in contrast to WKHµSHUVRQDO¶
friendship model (Rouner, 1994; Fitzgerald, 1997; Haseldine, 1999; Shannon, 2002; Roshchin 2016; 2017). It is 
simply not possible to assume that the view of friendship which is prevalent in contemporary Western cultures is 
either universal, trans-historical, or even unproblematic. Thus, Smith has argued that what might be termed the 
µFRQWHPSRUDU\-DIIHFWLYH¶PRGHORIIULHQGVKLSVKRXOGQRWEHWDNHQWRVWDQGIRUDOOIRUPVRIIULHQGVKLS6PLWKSRLQWV
out that even this model of friendship is not as clear-cut or as unproblematic as might be thought as it raises a host 
of questions about the contours of friendship itself (Smith 2011: 1-15). This is not to say that some have not 
attempted to connect a more ordinary sense of friendship to politics (Pangle 2003 and King 2007 might be 
considered to be doing this). However, when this occurs the personal account tends to be understood not just in 
terms of the affections and a dyadic relation, but as a forum for the realisation of a more public good such as virtue 
or justice. In this sense this understanding of personal friendship adds something that the privatised and personal 
view of friendship often omits. 
-XVWDVWKHFULWLFV¶IUDPLQJRIWKHRQWRORJ\RIIULHQGVKLSKDVEHHQFKDOOHQJHGVRWRRKDVWKHFODLPWKDWIULHQGVKLS
has either limited or negative ethical consequences for politics. Work exists which engages with this aspect of 
IULHQGVKLSDQGVXJJHVWVLWVSRVVLELOLWLHV(G\YDQHKDVDGGUHVVHGWKHLVVXHVVXUURXQGLQJWKHVXSSRVHGµSDUWLDOLW\¶
of friendship arguing that a commitment to friends can generate an commitment to impartiality (2007: 154-7).  
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:KLOVW.LQJWHQGVWRIRFXVRQDPRUHSHUVRQDOIRUPRIIULHQGVKLSUDWKHUWKDQDµFLYLFIULHQGVKLS¶KHLVFDUHIXO
to underline its ethical potential. King recognises that it is unlikely that affection can extend too widely, but argues 
that friendship has a beneficial impact on society as a whole. Importantly, friendship works against the dangers 
RI D KRPRJHQHRXV PDVV DQG SUHVHUYHV SDUWLFXODULW\   )ULHQGVKLS HQDEOHV LQGLYLGXDOV WR µUHODWH LQ D
FLYLOLVHGDQGGLVLQWHUHVWHGZD\¶).  Friedman has also shown how friendship has a supporting role in 
politics. Far from being ethically dubious because of its partiality, Friedman has shown how friendship enables 
its participants to see from standpoints other than their own. It also has a vital ethical role in supporting not only 
the existing culture of politics, but also the possibility of counter-culture. However, nowhere is the ethical 
significance of friendship more evident than in the work of Schwarzenbach (1996; 2009). Schwarzenbach 
GHYHORSVDNLQGRIFLYLFIULHQGVKLSZKLFKLVWREHXQGHUVWRRGDVDIRUPRIµHWKLFDOSUD[LV¶DQGZKLFKLVPRGHOOHG
on the otherwise excluded experience and labour of women. Schwarzenbach is clear that this form of friendship 
is not to replace democracy and liberal rights, but that it is the necessary ethical framework for the action necessary 
for these to be supported and fulfilled (Schwarzenbach 1996: 115-7; 2009: 242-245). In this way, Schwarzenbach 
has shown that civic friendship leads to a form of care between citizens, a form of care which is based on reason 
UDWKHUWKDQWKHHPRWLRQV$V6FKZDU]HQEDFKZULWHVµ)ULHQGVKLSOHDGVXVWRDPRUDOFRPPRQOLIH± one based on 
VKDUHGHQGVDQGDGRSWHGWKURXJKUHDVRQDEOHSULQFLSOHV¶6FKZDU]HQEDFK6XFKDFonception of civic 
IULHQGVKLSLOOXVWUDWHVIULHQGVKLS¶VFDSDFLW\WRVHUYHDVDSROLWLFDOFRQFHSWDQGLWLVDORQJZD\IURPWKHDVVXPSWLRQ
that friendship is, and can only be, a private emotional relation based on preference. Such an assumption unduly 
forecloses the possibility of friendship in politics. 
 
The concept of friendship: three approaches 
In the previous section, certain received views of friendship and the political have been challenged. In respect to 
friendship this involves moving beyond a narrow and restricted understanding which essentialises it as a private, 
personal and affective relation which is definitionally devoid of any political connection. However, if the concept 
of friendship is something more than the specific conceptualisations of friendship, then how can this be understood 
(see Lalumera, 2013)? 
To begin thinking in this direction it is useful to highlight one common set of problems by posing the questions 
µ:KDWLVIULHQGVKLS"¶DQGµ:KDWLVDIULHQG"¶+LVWRULFDOO\VLJQLILFDQWDWWHQWLRQKDVEHHQSDLGWRWKHVHFRQGRI
WKHVHTXHVWLRQVIDPRXVO\LWOHDGVWRDSRULDLQ3ODWR¶VLysis. In contrast, recent thought has focused on the first 
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question. The difference between the two questions might appear sophistic. After all, can there be friendship 
without friends; can there be friends without friendship? In fact, the move is consequential in a number of ways. 
First, in moving from the qualities of the friend to the notion of friendship, scholars have been able to appreciate 
DZLGHUDQGPRUHGLYHUVH UDQJHRISKHQRPHQD WKDQ IRFXVRQ µWKH IULHQG¶ would allow. Significantly, this has 
reopened the role that friendship can play between and within states and nations (Roshchin, 2006; Berenskoetter, 
2007; King and Smith, 2007; Devere et al., 2011; Oelsner and Vion, 2011; Roshchin, 2011; Koschut and Oelsner, 
2014) 6HFRQG E\ IRFXVLQJRQ IULHQGVKLS UDWKHU WKDQ WKHTXDOLWLHVRI µWKH IULHQG¶ UHFHQW VFKRODUVKLSKDVEHHQ
attentive to a politics where notions of the over-arching good have been called into question. Thus, friendship is 
a phenomenon which can be found in pre-PRGHUQPRGHUQDQGµSRVW-PRGHUQ¶SROLWLFV(Derrida, 1997; Pahl, 2000; 
Vernon, 2005; Spencer and Pahl, 2006; Kaplan, 2007; Vernon, 2010; May, 2012). Third, by focusing on friendship 
UDWKHUWKDQµWKHIULHQG¶UHFHQWVFKRODUVKLSKDVEHHQDEOHWR stress that the concept denotes a relationship. As such 
it indicates a set of interactions, expectations, and dynamics. 
Despite this tendency to refocus from the question of the friend to that of friendship, it is fair to say that no 
consensus exists on what friendship is. Multiple and diverse conceptions of friendship exist, and the definitional 
question persists. This raises a problem common to a number of concepts: defined too tightly friendship is bound 
to vanish (no single candidate turns out to be an instance); defined too loosely the concept loses its coherence and 
utility (too much becomes friendship (see Smith 2011: 10-11)). Furthermore, questions can also be raised 
FRQFHUQLQJZKDWµIULHQGVKLS¶LVQDPLQJLVLWWKDWWKHUHDUHPDQ\WKLQJVZKLFKKDSSen to share a name, or is it that 
some of the things which use the name have no business doing so? In order to bring some order to the diverse 
conceptualisations of friendship, and in order to respond to some of the questions that are raised about it as a 
concept, in what follows three approaches to understanding the concept of friendship are outlined. Friendship will 
be considered as: (1) a family-resemblance and cluster concept; (2) an essentially contested concept; and (3) as 
problématique. After these approaches have been outlined the article will conclude by discussing their 
compatibility. It will be argued that whilst all the three approaches focus on friendship they serve different 
SXUSRVHV7KHµIDPLO\-UHVHPEODQFH¶DSSURDFKDWWHPSWVWRLGHQWLI\GLIIHrent instances of friendship all of which 
are equally friendship; it is less concerned with the definition of friendship and is focused on how friendship is 
used. TKHµFRQWHVWHGFRQFHSW¶DSSURDFKDWWHPSWVWRILQGWKHSDUDGLJPDWLFH[DPSOHRIIULHQGVKLS; it attempts to 
evaluate competing conceptions of friendship. The problématique approach operates at the level of asking what 
function friendship plays in facilitating the political life at both a theoretical and practical level; it asks how 
friendship works on an ontological level. 
[Friendship as a Political Concept. Accepted Version: 12 June 2018] 
 
7 
 
 
Family resemblance and clusters 
One especially convincing response to the question and problems surrounding the concept of friendship has been 
developed by Digeser (Digeser, 2013; Digeser, 2016; see also Lynch, 2005; Smith, 2011). Digeser avoids the 
SUREOHPV RI D FHQWUDO GHILQLWLRQ E\ GHYHORSLQJ DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI µIULHQGVKLS¶ DV ERWK DQ LQVWDQFH RI ZKDW
:LWWJHQVWHLQ KDV FDOOHG µIDPLO\ UHVHPEODQFH¶ DQG FRQFHSWXDOLVHV LW DV DQ 2DNHVKRWWLDQ µSUDFWLFH¶ The basic 
intuition behind the family resemblance concept is as follows: when faced with a term the temptation is to assume 
that there is one way to define this, and that all instances of the term exhibit or conform to that central definition. 
However, Wittgenstein urges his reader to µORRNDQGVHH¶(Wittgenstein, 1953: §66). Taking as his example the 
GLVSDUDWH SUDFWLFHV FDOOHG µJDPHV¶ :LWWJHQVWHLQ SRLQWV-out how they can be compared and contrasted. 
:LWWJHQVWHLQ VHHV µD FRPSOLFDWHGQHWZRUNRI VLPLODULWLHVRYHUODSSLQJ DQG FULVV-crossinJ¶ (Wittgenstein, 1953: 
§66). Thus, although games share features they do not all share the same features.  It is this criss-crossing that 
links the games, not a central definition ± WKH\KDYHDµIDPLO\UHVHPEODQFH¶(Wittgenstein, 1953: §67). 
As developed by Digeser, friendship as family resemblance goes a long way to both alleviating some of the anxiety 
VXUURXQGLQJWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµIULHQGVKLS¶DQGVKRZLQJZKDWNLQGRIDFRQFHSWLWPLJKWEH(Digeser, 2016: 10-11). 
It moves away from the debilitating fetish of seeking a complete and final answer (debilitating because of the 
associated problems of definition mentioned above). The edges of such a concept are likely to be blurry, but this 
does not make the concept any less useful. Rather it reflects actual use. It also shows how different conceptions 
of friendship can co-H[LVWDOWKRXJK WKLVGRHVQRWPHDQ WKDW LQGLYLGXDOVFDQQRW µSUHIHU¶FHUWDLQFRQFHSWLRQVRI
friendship. 
,Q DGGLWLRQ WR WKH µIDPLO\ UHVHPEODQFH¶ DFFRXQW GHYHORSHG E\ 'LJHVHU LW LV DOVR LOOXPLQDWing to consider the 
SRVVLELOLWLHVRIDVLPLODUDQGFRQQHFWHGDSSURDFKWKHµFOXVWHUFRQFHSW¶(Gasking, 1960). Here people may hold 
different criteria for applying a word, but still use it for the same set of things. Gasking writes that: 
When an omnifocal set is thought of in this way, as definable in terms of any member, any such 
GHILQLWLRQEHLQJUHJDUGHGDVMXVWDVFRUUHFWDVDQ\RWKHU,FDOOWKHVHWDµFOXVWHU¶(Gasking, 1960: 
12) 
$OWKRXJK VLPLODU WR :LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V µIDPLO\ UHVHPEODQFH¶ (cf. Parsons, 1973) *DVNLQJ¶V YLHZ KLJKOLJKWV WZR
further considerations relevant for understanding the concept of friendship. First, people do ± in fact ± attempt to 
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use criteria to identify sets. Disputes arise because of differing views about what should belong to a given group. 
Defining membership of many groups is not simply analytic but can only be done in reference to a linguistic and 
FXOWXUDO FRPPXQLW\ )ULHQGVKLS LV HVSHFLDOO\ VXEMHFW WR WKLV 6HFRQG *DVNLQJ¶V DFFRXQW HPSKDVLVHV KRZ
membership of the cluster can change. Items move in and out, and the cluster can lose members and include new 
ones (Gasking, 1960: 15, 23). This helps to account for both variation and innovation in what is considered to be 
IULHQGVKLSµ)ULHQGVKLS¶LVDFRQFHSWZKLFKGHQRWHVQRWRQO\Dgroup of members who share overlapping, but no 
core, features; it is also a concept which denotes a group of members which are subject to change and cultural 
variation. 
These approaches help clarify what the concept of friendship is about, and how that concept relates to specific 
conceptions of friendship. It also opens a space for a consideration that some friendships can be political. In other 
words, the concept of friendship itself is neither political nor non-political, but certain conceptions of friendship 
might well be ± and they are just as much friendship as any other conception of friendship. 
 
Essentially Contested Concepts 
$QRWKHUZD\RIDSSURDFKLQJµIULHQGVKLS¶LVWRFRQVLGHULWDQLQVWDQFHRI*DOOLH¶VFODVVRIµHVVHQWLDOO\FRQWHVWHG
FRQFHSWV¶ (Gallie, 1956). Gallie distinguishes between concepts which are contested in the sense that there 
happens to be a dispute but where those disputes could (in theory) be resolved (Gallie, 1956: 167-168), and those 
FRQFHSWVµWKHSURSHUXVHRIZKLFKLQHYLWDEO\LQvolves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their 
XVHUV¶(Gallie, 1956: 169; Garver, 1978; cf. Smith, 2002). Whilst it might well be true that there are far fewer 
essentially contested concepts than might be first supposed (Smith, 2002), nevertheless friendship is a candidate 
for inclusion into this class of concepts. It is also not insignificant that the concept of politics itself can also be 
thought of in this way (Connolly, 1993). 
*DOOLHRXWOLQHVVHYHQµFRQGLWLRQVRIHVVHQWLDOFRQWHVWHGQHVV¶,QVXPPDU\µHVVHQWLDOO\FRQWHVWHGFRQFHSWV¶DUH,
µapprasive LQWKHVHQVHWKDW LWVLJQLILHVRUDFFUHGLWVVRPHNLQGRIYDOXHGDFKLHYHPHQW¶,,LQWHUQDOO\FRPSOH[
(appraisal applies not just to the parts, but the whole); (III) have competing ways of evaluating the achievement 
which weight different aspects of the internal structure differently; (IV) the achievement can be modified; (V) and 
that those using the essentially contested concept recognise that others use it in a contested and competing way. 
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)XUWKHUPRUH 9, WKH FRQFHSW LV GHULYHG IURP D PXWXDOO\ UHFRJQLVHG µH[HPSODU¶ DQG 9,, WKH FRQWHVW IRU
acknowledgement between the users of the concept sustains or develops the achievement (Gallie, 1956: 180). 
µ)ULHQGVKLS¶FDQEHWKRXJKWRIDVDn essentially contested concept in this sense. First (conditions (I) and (II)), 
IULHQGVKLSLVµDSSUDVLYH¶DQGDµYDOXHGDFKLHYHPHQW¶QRWMXVWLQWHUPVRIVRPHRILWVIHDWXUHVEXWDVDUHVXOWRIWKH
whole. Indeed, in this respect it seems that friendship is universally valued across cultures and history, and there 
are numerous examples of true and worthy friendship which are contrasted to evaluations of friendships which 
have been false or corrupted. Second (conditions (III) and (IV)), it is clear that there could be any number of ways 
RISUDFWLFLQJIULHQGVKLSDQGWKXVIULHQGVKLSLVµLQLWLDOO\YDULRXVO\GHVFULEDEOH¶(Gallie, 1956: 172). Clearly, too, 
IULHQGVKLSFKDQJHVRULVPRGLILHGLWKDVDQµRSHQ¶FKDUDFWHU:KDWLVPRUHGLIIHUHQWµWUDGLWLRQV¶SODFHGLfferent 
weight on the possible features of friendship thus producing different accounts (cf. Ruben, 2010: 268-269). Third, 
condition (V) is recognised in both the very theorisation of friendship and its practice. Not only do different 
thinkers recognise that they are in discussion about the meaning and practice of friendship, but friends themselves 
µFRPSHWH¶WRUHDOLVHWKHLUYHUVLRQVRIIULHQGVKLS$FFRUGLQJWR*DUYHUWKLVµUKHWRULFDOVLWXDWLRQ¶LVQHFHVVDU\WR
make a concept contested (Garver, 1978: 163). The contestation is generated by a linguistic community, not by 
WKHFRQFHSWLQDEVWUDFWLRQ)LQDOO\ LWPLJKWVHHPDELWSHFXOLDUWRFRQVLGHUIULHQGVKLSDVKDYLQJDQµH[HPSODU¶
(condition VI). However, this is to be understood broadly. Whilst there is not a single exemplar of friendship, the 
concept does have exemplars in terms of those who have produced paradigms and paragons of friendship, thus 
providing examples for others to emulate (on the notions of traditon and faithfulness to exemplars see Ruben, 
2010: 262ff). Again, it is worth stressing that this endeavour is both trans-historical and cross-cultural. In relation 
to condition (VII) it would seem to be the case that in both the theorisation (and practice) of friendship the 
µDFKLHYHPHQW¶RIIULHQGVKLp is being sustained and developed. 
6XFKDQDSSURDFKFRQWUDVWVZLWK WKDWRI µIDPLO\ UHVHPEODQFH¶ LQ WKH VHQVH WKDWZKHUHDV µIDPLO\ UHVHPEODQFH¶
DGGUHVVHVTXHVWLRQVRIWKHFRKHUHQFHDQGXVHRIDQFRQFHSW*DOOLH¶VQRWLRQFRQWULEXWHVWRDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJDERXt 
how a concept might work in terms of its development through interaction between rival users (Gallie, 1956: 198, 
193),I:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VDSSURDFKLVWROHDYHDFRQFHSWLQDVWDWHRIXVHIXOYDJXHQHVVWKHQ*DOOLH¶VDSSURDFKLVWR
show how people utilise that vagueness (cf. Ruben, 2010: 261),QWKHFDVHRI IULHQGVKLS*DOOLH¶VQRWLRQDOVR
captures some of the intuition about what kind of a concept friendship is and what is happening when competing 
conceptions are produced, or practices of friendship are compared. Such an approach clearly links back to the 
notion of a practice suggested by Digeser. Put succinctly: as an essentially contested concept, friendship might 
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have political aspects. Furthermore, there are also specifically political forms of friendship: civic friendship, 
political friendship, republican friendship, fraternity, comradeship, as well as friendship on the international stage. 
Each of these is a competing form of friendship, and there is competition within and between each conception to 
set the standard. 
 
Problématique 
The final way of approaching friendship is to understand the term as denoting a problématique. Problématique 
involves the theorisation and exploration of the bonds between person and person, or group and group (for 
examples see: King and Smith, 2007: 1-6; Devere and Smith, 2010: 341-344, 351-352; Smith, 2011: 1-15). Such 
an approach admits the diversity of friendship, but it also seeks to identify the deeper and wider questions and 
problems that connect specific manifestations and constructions to politics. Thus, it imagines persons not just in 
UHODWLRQVKLSVRIµSRZHU¶RUDVKDYLQJµDIIHFWLYHWLHV¶EXWDOVRFODLPVWKDWIULHQGVKLSLVµDOZD\VVKRUHGXSE\PRUDO
SULQFLSOHVRIVRPHNLQGRUDQRWKHU¶(King and Smith, 2007: 6). In this view, friendship denotes a field of human 
relations which give rise to an order, but such relations and their order cannot be separated from axiological 
considerations. 
Approaching friendship in this way moves away from definitions and refocuses attention to a set of questions. 
Such questions focus on the location and construction of subjectivity, the relationship between self and other, and 
identity and difference (Derrida, 1997, Schmitt, 1996). Such questions also ask about equality, shared activity, 
virtue, affection, care, and obligation. Importantly these questions speak to the co-construction and co-habitation 
of a shared world of order and value (Hayden, 2015). Such a world is not only the world of an interconnected 
friendship, it is also political. The self is always and necessarily connected to others, and must find a way of 
organising and valuing in this shared condition. 
In taking friendship to be indicative of these questions, this final approach creates a problématique which is 
perhaps most obviously political, but which also moves away from standard conceptualisations of friendship 
(although this article has raised questions about such claims (cf. Smith, 2011)). Yet is it important to note what is 
going on here. For whilst this approach to friendship eschews the demand to define friendship (although see King, 
2007), it is not unconcerned with the relationship of different conceptions of friendship to the concept of friendship 
as a problématique ± indeed, it is dependent on it. In one construction this approach is concerned to show the 
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contours within which any conception of friendship must be framed. In this respect it provides analytical tools not 
for the definition of friendship, but for understanding the background conditions and assumptions that must be 
made in order for the construct to get off the ground. In another (but related) version, friendship operates on two 
levels. The anterior level is the basic binding that takes place between self and others; the second level is the 
crystallisation of these bonds into various identifiable forms of friendship (Smith, 2014). This view underlines the 
possibility of reconfiguring forms of friendship (and thus the political order that depends on them), but also 
stresses that we can never dispense with friendship itself. 
In summary, this approach understands friendship to denote a set of questions that point to what is often 
overlooked in many conceptions of politics, but what is indispensable to any concept of politics: the necessity of 
the bonds between person and person, group and group. Without this connective tissue politics would be neither 
structured nor animated. This approach suggests that a theorisation of friendship is necessary for a successful 
theorisation of politics. Friendship therefore looks at the diverse and multifaceted bonds which (like politics) can 
manifest in any number of ways, but the concept itself points to a central problématique that attempts to theorise 
bonds between persons or groups in a shared world of order and value. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has undertaken groundwork preparing the way for future analyses of friendship and politics. Although 
some views are critical about the connection, this article has shown why these must not simply be accepted, but 
challenged. Critical views tend to UHO\RQDQRYHUO\ UHVWULFWLYHYLHZRI µIULHQGVKLS¶ a view which is not only 
culturally and historically contingent, but also a view which is in need of its own analysis. Addressing friendship, 
this article has outlined three possible approaches to understanding this concept. Specifically, friendship has been 
considered as: (1) a family-resemblance and cluster concept; (2) an essentially contested concept; and (3) 
indicative of a problématique. These approaches are not intended to be exhaustive ± and scholars might well 
develop new ways of approaching friendship and politics. 
In concluding it is desirable to offer comment on the relationship between these approaches. In particular, it might 
be asked to what extent they are compatible. To respond it is necessary to think of the approaches not only in 
terms of what they tell us about how friendship can be conceptualised, but also in terms of their underlying 
SXUSRVHVRUDLPV,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHWKUHHDSSURDFKHVDUHQRWVLPSO\ZD\VRIFRQFHSWXDOLVLQJµIULHQGVKLS¶WKH\
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also represent different ways of deploying or using friendship. If the question of compatibility is seen from this 
SHUVSHFWLYHWKHQLWFDQEHFRQFOXGHGWKDWZKLOVWWKHWKUHHDSSURDFKHVDOOIRFXVRQµIULHQGVKLS¶WKH\DUHWU\LQJWR
achieve different things with that focus. As such, the question of compatibility cannot arise in a simple way.  
To ilOXVWUDWHWKLVFRQVLGHUWKHµIDPLO\UHVHPEODQFH¶DQGµFRQWHVWHGFRQFHSW¶DSSURDFKHVILUVW,QVRIDUDVWKH\ERWK
eschew the centrality of a final or standard definition of friendship they appear to be similar. However, this 
similarity is superficial. What the family resemblance approach attempts to do is not to define what friendship is, 
but to collect, collate, and examine the different ideas and practices that have been called friendship. The meaning 
of friendship is connected to its use, and there are a variety of ways that µfriendship¶LVXVHG. Thus whilst forms 
of friendship can be differentiated, WKH\DUHQRWPHDVXUHGDJDLQVWDVWDQGDUG,QFRQWUDVWWKHµFRQWHVWHGFRQFHSW¶
approach operates in a different way. Whilst in the contested concept view there is an expectation that different 
forms of friendship will be identified the purpose is not to catalogue them but to evaluate them. Whilst the 
FRQWHVWHG FRQFHSW YLHZ DFFHSWV WKDW WKHUH LVQ¶W DQ\ ILQDO UHVROXWLRQ WR ZKDW FRXQWV DV WKH SDUDGLJPDWLF FDVH
contenders for the paradigmatic case are sought and used to assess other cases. In other words, the difference 
between the family resemblance approach and the contested concept approach is that whilst they both recognise 
that there are likely to be many examples of friendship, the family resemblance approach resits trying to discern 
a paradigmatic case by which they can be assessed whereas the contested concepts approach is precisely geared 
towards this.  In this way, the family resemblance approach can be considered to be primarily concerned with a 
NLQG RI µSKHQRPHQRORJ\¶ LW WULHV WR identify the kinds of things that are considered friendship) whereas the 
FRQWHVWHGFRQFHSWVDSSURDFKLVSULPDULO\FRQFHUQHGZLWKµSDUDGLJPDWLFQRUPDWLYLW\¶LWWULHVWRILQGDVWDQGDUGWR
be both emulated and by which other things that are called friendship can be evaluated). Thus, these two 
approaches are attempting to do different things. It could be, of course, that once a variety of friendship is 
identified (for example, political friendship), then it is possible to move from the phenomenological enquiry and 
into a game of contesting a paradigmatic case within that variety. However, ostensibly the two approaches are not 
compatible as one clearly eschews a central and defining case whereas this is precisely what the other seeks and 
is the source of the contestation. 
This leaves the final approach: problématique. Again, this can be contrasted to the previous approaches which are 
DERXWGHILQLWLRQLQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKH\HLWKHUWU\WRLGHQWLI\WKHPXOWLSOHZD\VWKDWµIULHQGVKLS¶LVXVHGIDPLO\-
resemblance), or try to identify DFRUHRUSDUDGLJPDWLFPHDQLQJRIµIULHQGVKLS¶FRQWHVWHGFRQFHSWV5DWKHUWKDQ
focus on definition, problematique considers the function of friendship in politics. This approach looks to the 
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work that friendship does in holding politics together both in terms of the structures that it enables and the values 
that it promotes. In this way problématique presupposes a connection between friendship and politics and attempts 
to show how notions of friendship are already (and sometimes necessarily) operative in political theory and 
practice. Rather than attempt to say what friendship is, or what it should be, problématique looks at what friendship 
does. It is primarily concerned with how friendship holds politics together, and how it supports political action 
and values. In this way the question of compatibility with the other approaches does not arise in a straight-forward 
fashion as this approach is simply attempting to do a different kind of thing with friendship. 
This article has identified and explored some of the existing literature on friendship as a political concept, both 
sceptical and supportive. It has also proposed three approaches to understanding friendship, and has suggested 
that each is attempting to achieve something different in making the connection between friendship and politics. 
As such, this article has undertaken groundwork making a prima facie case for the possibility of an analysis of 
friendship as a political concept. The way is now open for others to build on this and to produce understandings 
and conceptualisations of friendship and politics. Such work promises not only to reconnect politics with a 
neglected concern, but also to provide new ways of theorising and exploring an increasingly globalised, cross-
cultural and complex political scene. 
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